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POLITICS IN PRACTICE 





Politics, like sex and religion can be relied on for more than its fair share of 
controversy. So considering how best to approach political material occurring in the 
course of analytic therapy seems fitting in a book about analytical controversies- 
especially since most therapists have probably wondered at one time or another how 
best to work with their client’s political issues. Having said that, in this article, I will 
be arguing against the radical revisioning of therapy in response to such material. I 
will be making three main points.  
 
Firstly in therapy, as in most walks of life, it is generally advisable to replace a 
particular practice, only when the old one is demonstrably damaging or 
counterproductive. It will be my contention, with certain provisos, that this has not 
been demonstrated with regard to conventional analytical psychotherapy’s approach 
to political material.  
 
Secondly if a practice is replaced, it is up to the innovator to show that the new one 
will not cause more harm than the one it is replacing. I will be raising various doubts 
and questions about this in relation to the sanctioning of ‘political discussion’ in the 
course of therapy. In particular I will be questioning whether the therapist can become 
involved in such discussions without the client’s individuation process becoming 
obstructed through the imposition of the therapist’s own unconscious material. 
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Underlying this doubt is the assumption that therapy is not an equal relationship, 
because one person pays another for expert help with their problems. That help, is 
dependant upon the therapist being able to listen to the client- and their own 
countertransference responses - in a therapeutic way.1 It is hard to see how this 
therapeutic listening can be combined with active involvement in political discussion. 
 
Thirdly I will be drawing on my own personal analyses to show what can happen in 
practice when therapists do get drawn into political discussions with their clients. This 





There can be little doubt however that over the years analysts of all persuasions have 
tended to reinterpret their patient’s concerns about the ‘outside world’ in terms of 
their own particular theoretical preoccupations. So during Melanie Klein’s (1961) 
wartime analysis of Richard, she was interested the Oedipal aspect of his fear of 
Hitler invading Britain, not its realistic elements.  And when Donald Meltzer (1978) 
re-examined the case, he did so in the light of his own theoretical preoccupation with 
the transference, if anything offering even less recognition of Richard’s real concerns 
about the course of the war. 
 
It also seems indisputable that the psyche regularly picks up on, and reacts to, events 
in the outside world- often without full conscious awareness of this. This seems to 
have happened for example when the participants in the legendary controversial 
discussions were locked in battle about the place of hatred and aggression in their 
                                                 
1 Freud (1912) Bion  (1967) and others have characterised this therapeutic listening as an ‘evenly 
suspended attention’ or as an analytic ‘reverie’, while Fordham (1993) referring to Reik (1949) talks of 
listening with the ‘third ear’.  
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psychological theories. On that occasion Donald Winnicott attempted to bring the 
protagonists to their senses by famously remarking ‘I should like to point out that 
there is an air raid going on’ (Grosskurth 1985 p.321), highlighting (perhaps 
unconsciously) the connection between the battle in the room and the one going on 
outside. 
 
It is hard therefore to disagree with Samuels’ contention that analytical 
psychotherapists have often failed to give due weight to both their client’s conscious 
concerns about the outside world and their unconscious reactions to it. I will be 
arguing however that it is possible to adequately address those concerns and reactions 
without the radical revisioning of therapy he advocates. On this view it is the analyst’s 
own preoccupations that have tended to exclude the client’s concerns about the world 
from the consulting room- not something intrinsic to the analytic process. The 
deliberate politicisation of analysis along the lines suggested by Samuels is therefore 
at best unnecessary, and at worst counter-therapeutic. 
 
I will be using a mixture of recent case material, and my own experience as an 
analytic patient to support these contentions. Initially however I wish touch on 
Samuels’ paradoxical finding that despite not being involved in a war (at the time of 
writing) therapists seem if anything, more willing than ever to discuss politics with 
their clients. Could this be indicative of anything more than the quickening pace of 




The intrusion of the political 
 
For James Hillman (1994) the answer is an emphatic ‘Yes’. The intrusion of politics 
into practice is a symptom of psychotherapy’s attempt to put an end to itself. The 
psychotherapy of individuals, he argues, has traditionally been concerned with the 
Self, with ego-strength and with individuation. In this way it has reinforced an 
alienated post-Cartesian world-view, which sees us as isolated individuals living in a 
dead material world. He welcomes the intrusion of politics into practice as a return of 
the world soul to undermine that world-view in its inner sanctum. And he regards the 
ordinary analytic reluctance to discuss politics as a pathological defence against the 
threat of that intrusion. He has gone on to give up practicing individual therapy, which 
he now believes, is inimical to his broader project of bringing soul back to the world.  
 
 Samuels is familiar with Hillman’s arguments, and is clearly sympathetic to his 
overall project. But he falls short of advocating the end of individual psychotherapy. 
In fact Samuels’ article can be read as an answer to Hillman- an attempt to defend 
therapy from his attacks by defining the conditions under which therapists and their 
clients may legitimately involve themselves in political discussions. On a practical 
level for example he argues that the containment of the analytic frame can render such 
discussions therapeutic. And he backs this up theoretically by proposing that each 
person could be regarded as possessing an innate political potential. The realisation of 
that potential would then become as much a part of a person’s individuation process 
as the fulfilment of their work or love life, and discussing politics a part of routine 
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analytic work. The following personal experiences however, seem to highlight some 
of the dangers inherent in Samuels’ proposals.2 
  
Politics in practice 
 
 
The first analysis 
 
I began my first analytic training with an organisation that attempted to integrate 
psychoanalytic and Jungian ideas, in the early eighties. My analyst, who was suffering 
from age-related ill health, had been a communist in her youth and was still a Marxist 
sympathiser (as was I). She was on a direct line of analytic descent from Freud, and 
had set the training up. It soon became apparent however that the organisation was in 
the throws of a traumatic power struggle. This struggle directly affected me in various 
ways, and I was flattered and grateful but also a little uneasy, about my analyst’s 
frank discussion of the related political issues in therapy with me. These issues were 
complex, but one important strand concerned the conflict between her Marxist 
inspired desire to provide therapy for the people, and the emerging organisation’s 
more ‘conservative’ wish for the ‘highest’ possible training standards. Thus the 
frequency of analytic sessions for trainees became a subject of heated debate, for 
instance. In England these political strands are represented by the colours red and blue 
respectively. 
One day I dreamed that I was attempting to enter a large department store through a 
revolving door. There were guards on the door. I managed to evade them and get into 
the building, but there was still an unpleasant paranoid atmosphere. I went into a lift 
and found myself naked as it began to descend. Ducking anxiously into a nearby 
storeroom in the basement I found some clothes. Some were blue and some were red. 
                                                 
2 As regards the apparent increase in political material in analysis, I suspect that this is largely due to 
the greater general openness to multiple discourses that characterises much of our post-modern world. 
In analytic terms this would translate into a lessening of the insistence that ‘proper analysis’ is really 
about one particular thing- whether that thing is the inner world, the transference, the archetypes or 
anything else  (See Hauke, 2000 and McLeod 1997). 
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I was unable to make up my mind which to put on, but to my relief found some purple 
ones and left the storeroom in them. 
 
Purple of course is a combination of red and blue, but I am less concerned with the 
meaning of this dream, than with my analyst’s reaction to it. When I related it, she 
responded by asking if I was mad. I sat up on the couch in some alarm, and obviously 
terrified she declared that one of us had to be mad. That day someone else had had 
exactly the same dream and that wasn’t possible. She then proceeded to lapse into a 
florid paranoid psychotic breakdown. Some months later when she had somewhat 
recovered she told me it was her who had had the same dream, and also that this had 
not been her first psychotic episode. Not surprisingly perhaps, this incident brought 
about the total collapse of the therapeutic relationship and also undermined my first 
training experience. 
 
Nowadays all reputable therapeutic organisations insist that their members take part in 
continuing professional development programmes, which ensures analyst’s work is 
regularly monitored and helps prevent the occurrence of such events.  Certainly the 
actual psychotic breakdown of the analyst in a session is extremely rare, and therefore 
perhaps best dismissed as an unfortunate one-off experience. I have included this 
incident in the present account though because I believe it illustrates a general 
problem in an extreme form. If the therapist shares her political beliefs with the client, 
it may encourage him to identify with her position rather than evolve one of his own. 
The unconscious dynamics underlying that identification will then tend to get enacted, 
rather than analysed in the exchange of political views. Of course the same process 
could occur in relation to other emotive topics on which the analyst expresses an 
opinion. But the passions and judgement that are an intrinsic part of politics make it 
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especially prone to this danger. In this case the unconscious identification with my 
analyst seems to have somehow produced a shared dream. Perhaps she experienced 
this as intrusive and conceivably this contributed to pushing her into a psychotic state.  
(Searles 1959). 
 
If my first analysis illustrates the potential for political discussion to promote an 
engulfing amalgam of analyst and client, my second illustrates the opposite danger.   
 
The second analysis 
 
My new analyst, a Jungian, was like my first a Jewish refugee from the Nazis. I soon 
found out she had understandable but particularly strong feelings about the 
interminable Arab Israeli conflict, which then, like now was in a state of eruption. 
Material related to this often entered the sessions. I dreamed at the start of the analysis 
for instance that: -  
 
I was in a desolate wasteland/garden up an old tree picking plums, which I was 
passing down to Sigmund Freud who was collecting them in a basket. A disembodied 
voice ordered everyone to leave. The Israeli air force was about to bomb the garden, 
which would then be concreted over to make way for some sort of commercial 
development. 
 
I will return to some interpretations of this dream towards the end of the paper. For 
the moment however, I will continue with the theme of the intrusion of politics into 
this analysis. 
  
I sometimes brought my outrage about Israeli rocket attacks on Palestinian refugee 
camps into sessions. My highly respected analyst, excellent in many other ways, felt 
 8
compelled to get drawn into political discussions on such occasions. She would 
‘inform’ me for instance of the ‘fact’ that the Palestinians had sold their lands to 
Israeli settlers and were deliberately maintaining refugee camps unnecessarily in order 
to court international sympathy. Perhaps she believed that she was helping me 
become conscious of things I was unconscious of in this way. But I experienced her as 
more concerned to force me to adopt her views than understand (the unconscious 
motivation underlying the expression of) mine. I would leave these sessions feeling 
angry and cheated.  
 
When I voiced these feelings she responded by wondering about the transference and 
counter-transference. Was I perhaps re-enacting with her an adolescent rebellion I had 
been unable to have with my father? This felt a bit more like analysis, but in fact 
arguing about politics with my father had been one of the many pleasures of our 
relationship. What is more, I felt my differences of opinion with him had been 
respected in a way they were not with her. Our impasse continued, and I brought this 
material for a long time looking for some sort of resolution or understanding that 
never came. But I eventually desisted and resigned myself to potentially excluding 
important elements from my analysis in the process. 
 
I can see now that I probably unconsciously contributed to this unresolved conflict 
myself, partly perhaps as a means of avoiding a repetition of the disastrous 
identification with my first analyst. My second analyst’s willingness to get involved 
in political discussions with me however meant that this went completely unanalysed, 
along with my yearning for fusion, my fear of that yearning, and the work of 
mourning my first analyst. In addition her aggressive defence of Zionism meant that I 
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was able to split off and project my own aggression into her. The work of re-
integrating it thus got blocked, as we became stuck in a paranoid schizoid way of 





These personal experiences have no doubt contributed to my distrust of political 
discussions in analytic sessions. But I believe they also illustrate some generic 
problems and dangers.  
 
The first concern is that Samuels’ proposal to politicise analysis could encourage  
‘reactive’ as opposed to ‘reflective’ analysis out of the counter-transference. Both my 
analysts seem to have enacted their counter-transference feelings in their political 
discussions with me, instead of reflecting on them and using them in the service of the 
analysis.  
 
Samuels no doubt would argue that such ‘reactive analysis’ happens already when 
analysts let slip their views about morality, religion, relationships etc. But of course 
that does not mean such practices should be condoned. On the contrary they nearly 
always distort the analytic process, and interfere with the client’s individuation. The 
effects of this can be very hard to acknowledge and work through. Since the 
judgements that are an inevitable part of political discussion make it especially likely 
to stir up powerful emotional reactions, underlying unconscious material can easily 
become obscured. How can therapy be protected from these effects?  
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The above experiences seem to show that the existence of the analytic frame per se, 
affords absolutely no protection whatsoever.  
 
In addition, in practice the client is likely to feel pressured to adopt the analyst’s 
political views, especially in a training analysis. But even if he reacts against this 
pressure, he is not really developing his own position.  
 
On a related note, the spectre of the Nazis and of totalitarian communism is not so 
distant a memory as to rule out the nightmare scenario of analysis being used as a 
means of social and political control, with opposing political opinions being treated as 
pathological. To a certain extent this probably happens already when politics is 
discussed in analysis. And the ongoing computerisation of health and police records, 
together with the right of courts to access ‘confidential’ patient notes, adds another 
dimension to such fears. Perhaps the reluctance of many analysts to get further mixed 
up in politics could be understood in this light.  
 
I expect Samuels would argue however that he is not supporting the sort of analytic 
practices I am describing above. In fact he would probably regard his proposals to 
self-consciously politicise analysis as aiming to counteract such malpractice. But if 
this is the case, he fails to show how those proposals might actually help that aim be 
achieved.  
 
He advocates the introduction of ‘political discussion’ into ordinary analytic work for 
instance without identifying what he means by this. Is he talking about ‘discussion’ in 
its ordinary sense- an exchange of personal political views between client and 
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therapist? If he is, it is hard to see how this type of discussion could ever be 
therapeutic- for the reasons outlined above. Or does he have some specialised type of 
discussion in mind? He might for instance envisage the specific use of political 
discussion to facilitate dialogue between different parts of the client’s psyche. This 
looks more therapeutically promising, and it does seem to tally with the one relevant 
piece of clinical material he presents. 
 
That material it will be recalled involved an Italian man who dreamed of a beautiful, 
isolated, deep, clear lake. He associated the lake to himself and contrasted it with the 
Adriatic coast and its tourism and pollution. Samuels used this material to facilitate a 
dialogue between a part of the client that wished to withdraw from the emotional 
pollution of the world, and another that wished to engage with it in political activity. 
This material seems at first sight fairly innocuous. It also seems similar to the sort of 
work many of us are doing or trying to do already. But as we have seen, Samuels 
treats the client’s political potential as possessing a special innate or constitutional 
factor. So at this point he would have to be very careful not to allow a theory driven 
privileging of political action to lead him to underestimate the importance of the call 
for withdrawal from the world in his client’s dream material.  
 
Of course there are practitioners of holistic medicine- Engel (1977), Pietroni (1996), 
Broom (1997) etc.- who rely on a ‘bio-psycho-social’ model of health. They do link 
mind, body and social concerns in their work, and their practices may be informed by 
analytic understanding. But they would not claim to be practicing analysis when they 
work in this way. Analysts who wish to continue practicing analysis tend to refer their 
clients to colleagues for medical treatment rather than risk falling prey to therapeutic 
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omnipotence by consulting with them themselves- even if they are medically 
qualified. I believe that analysts who engage politically with their client’s material 
risk falling prey to a similar therapeutic omnipotence. 
 
At this point a further question arises; ‘ Why stop at politics?’ Why is political 
discussion any more therapeutically central, important or innately determined than 
discussion about physical health, the desire to retreat from the world, or any number 




But if political discussion in therapy is no longer sanctioned by appealing to the 
special status of ‘political potential’ in individuation, then how can analysis be 
protected from Hillman’s attacks on it? Furthermore couldn’t the above account of my 
two analyses be regarded as lending further ammunition to those attacks? 
  
It is true that my first analysis was indirectly ended via the intrusion of politics. 
Hillman would presumably regard this as symptomatic of individual therapy’s healthy 
wish to put an end to itself.  It seems to me however to be more symptomatic of the 
difficulty my analyst and I had in working with the unconscious processes underlying 
our shared political material and was the result of a departure from standard analytic 
practice. If I am highlighting the failures in both my analyses, it is in the hope that 
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something useful can be learned from them- not in order to attack analysis. In fact I 
benefited in different ways from both analyses, despite their difficulties.3 
 
Hillman it will be recalled objected to analysis on the grounds that it reinforces a 
Cartesian world-view of ourselves as isolated masters of a soulless world. And this 
may well be true of a kind of psychotherapy that emphasises ego strength at the 
expense of the unconscious. But analytic psychotherapy, it seems to me, asserts the 
precise opposite of this. It posits the otherness of the unconscious at the heart of the 
self and thereby subverts the sovereignty of the ego. This is profoundly undermining 
of the kind isolated individualism Hillman opposes, especially when that unconscious 
includes a collective (Jung) or linguistic (Lacan) element. In addition of course the 
relational aspect of much contemporary analytic practice further undermines 
individualism. For all these reasons I would argue that Hillman is mistaken when he 
regards the apparent analytic exclusion of politics as a symptom of its resistance to the 
overthrow of the Cartesian world-view. That view has been subverted already. 
Hillman however is presumably quite aware of these arguments. It seems likely 
therefore that his opposition to analysis springs from personal frustration with its 
rigours rather than from high-minded philosophical principles. But whatever 
Hillman’s motivation, Samuels’ ‘defence of analysis’ on the grounds of an appeal to 
innate political potential now begins to look unnecessary.  
 
I will move on next to consider how political material is treated in the course of an 
ordinary contemporary analysis. Is it possible to adequately address the client’s 
                                                 
3At this point I would like to thank both my analysts’ heirs for kindly granting permission to publish 
this sensitive material- and also Andrew Samuels whose ‘response’ to this paper alerted me to wisdom 
of seeking that permission. 
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legitimate political concerns without revisioning analytic theory and practice along 
the lines suggested by Samuels? 
 
An ordinary analytic case 
 
Peter was a young man in his late twenties with a socialist feminist political 
orientation in five times a week analysis. He lived in shared, co-operatively managed 
accommodation with a number of other like-minded men and women. He reported 
that a previous male resident had been expelled from the house after some ‘girlie 
magazines’ had been found in his room. Peter was terrified that if he betrayed feelings 
of sexual attraction towards any of the women they would experience this too as 
oppressive, and he himself would be expelled. Consequently he spent a lot of time 
alone in his room and avoided emotionally meaningful interactions with his 
housemates wherever possible. When these did occur he felt painfully oversensitive to 
their nuances and became terrified by the violence and intensity of the feelings and 
fantasies they aroused in him. This led him to withdraw further, worsening his 
problems. 
 
One day Peter shamefully reported that in a general election in his teens he had nearly 
voted for an extreme right wing political party. He desperately wanted to understand 
this action that was so contrary to his current political beliefs. The thing that disturbed 
him most was the party’s racist agenda, which led it to advocate the forced expulsion 
of immigrants.  
 
When he thought back to his life at the time, he recalled the following incident. His 
father (an alcoholic) had hit him, his mother and his numerous siblings throughout his 
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life. One day after dinner when his father went to attack his mother in a drunken state, 
Peter intervened physically and forced him off. His father reacted by attacking a 
different brother and furiously declaring that if Peter ever interfered in such a way 
again he would kick him out of the house. From then on he lived in constant fear of 
his father’s threat. 
 
With very little help from me, he was able to see that by nearly voting for the far right 
political party he was unconsciously identifying with his father. In other words he was 
hoping ‘his party’ would expel foreigners in the way he himself had feared being 
expelled. He went on to make some links with his present living situation- his fear of 
being thrown out again, his guilt about his relief that it was his housemate not him 
who had been expelled and so on.  
 
He then remarked that he had attempted to cope with his mother’s depression and lack 
of availability by becoming extremely self-sufficient from a very early age. This 
could be regarded, as a forced expulsion of his own dependency needs from his 
conscious psyche. The denial (expulsion) of his own needs in both his current living 
situation and his previous political belief system clearly reflected his continued use of 
this defensive strategy. He was greatly relieved to begin to understand the 
significance of his previously incomprehensible political flirtation in this light, and 
went on to address other therapeutic issues. 
 
I suspect this clinical vignette illustrates how many analysts might currently work 
with similar political material presented in a session, and I trust that Samuels too 
would probably find little to disagree with in the handling of this case so far. As we 
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have seen he does not specify what type of  ‘political discussion’ he wishes to 
encourage in therapy so it is hard to be sure of this. But it seems unlikely he intends 
the analyst to get drawn into a discussion of the relative merits of hard right as 
opposed to hard left politics in a situation such as this. Since his teens Peter has 
simply replaced one harsh set of political beliefs with another, leaving the underlying 
splits in his psyche unaltered. Discussing politics in this way would therefore not be 
therapeutic and could easily reinforce those splits.  
 
There are those who believe all meaningful analytic work must take place within the 
here and now of the transference relationship (see e.g. Proner, Hinshelwood current 
volume). Such analysts would no doubt attempt to relate Peter’s political dilemmas to 
that relationship, hoping to resolve the underlying splits in his psyche there. And in 
fact Peter and I did go on to address the way his conflicts manifested themselves in 
the therapeutic relationship. But many therapists besides Samuels would reject the 
reductive formulaic use of transference interpretations (Kast present volume, Peters 
1991) without espousing any ‘radical revisioning’ of analysis. How might Samuels’ 
views differ from theirs? 
 
At times I became identified in the counter-transference with Peter’s split off libidinal 
desires. This happened for instance when he first mentioned his housemate’s 
expulsion. I found myself then wanting to argue the case in favour of pornography 
and against the version of feminism prevalent in the group of people with whom he 
lived. Perhaps Samuels would advocate actually getting involved in a political 
discussion at this point. He might justify this as an exploration of Peter’s feelings 
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about the oppressive nature of the politically correct regime within which he lived, 
and/or an attempt to improve the relationship between different parts of himself.  
 
If I had got involved like that at this point however I believe there would have been a 
danger of simply returning Peter’s projected feelings to him undigested. In fact he was 
strongly identified with the socialist/feminist regime within which he lived initially. 
So if I had argued in favour of pornography at this point I could well have entrenched 
his identification with a harsh super-ego. He might have believed then, with some 
justification, that I was filled with dangerous sexual desires not him; and the 
reintegration of those desires would have got blocked.  
 
But Samuels might agree that under these circumstances it is better to wait until the 
client shows more awareness of the needy/sexual part of his psyche. Only then might 
he feel able to embark on a fruitful discussion of the conflict between that side of the 
client and the other more moralistic one. Such a ‘political discussion’ might 
conceivably have taken the form of a consideration of Peter’s conflicting attitudes to 
pornography. But if this is all Samuels is suggesting then it is hard to see how his 
position differs from that of many other ordinary therapists. In fact slightly later, 
when Peter had talked about his (fear of betraying) feelings of sexual attraction to his 
housemates we were able to address this split together. But the groundwork for this 
had already been laid by then through his recognition that the immigrants he had 
wished to expel in his teens also represented needy parts of himself.  
 
 18
This piece of clinical material appears to illustrate that it is possible to work with a 
client’s political material without either denying its importance or radically 
revisioning therapeutic practice. 
 
Citizen as therapist to the world 
 
Although most of the above considerations seem to militate against Samuel’s project 
to politicise analysis, there is another factor that appears to operate in its favour. Quite 
often in an analysis, material arises which has clear political connections. My dream 
of Freud, the garden, the tree and the Israeli air force quoted above is a case in point. 
  
 It will be recalled that in that dream the Israeli air force was about to bomb the 
desolate garden, and my feeling was that this was in order to make way for a 
commercial building development. The garden was effectively going to be concreted 
over. Firstly then the dream could be regarded as referring to the end of nature at the 
hands of the military industrial complex  (see e.g. Giddens 1991).  
 
But it could also be interpreted as a reaction to the Arab Israeli conflict. From this 
perspective the garden could represent a ruined Eden, with the plum tree 
corresponding to the tree of knowledge: I am then identified with the Palestinians who 
are about to be driven from the devastated Holy Land by the Israeli air force.  
 
A third political interpretation concerns the Freud Jung split. It will be recalled that at 
the time of the dream I had just moved from a Freudian to a Jungian analyst. The 
Israeli air force from this perspective is in the position of Jung in his conflict with 
 19
Freud. I am then in danger of being caught in a conflict of loyalties between my new 
Jungian analysis and my original psychoanalytically dominated training, which I feel I 
will have to leave. 
 
A fourth political interpretation concerns the demise of communism, which was in the 
process of succumbing to the cost of the arms race at the time of the dream. Freud 
would then stand for my Marxist Freudian analyst, who was being threatened by the 
capitalist-backed Israeli air force. 
  
The dream could thus be regarded as a counter-transference in Samuels’ sense to all 
these political situations. This observation seems to support Samuels’ conception of 
‘citizen as therapist to the world’. I cannot see though that acceptance of the notion of 
‘citizen as therapist to the world’ would actually require any change in analytic 
practice. What could my analyst have done about these political interpretations of the 
dream apart from acknowledge my feelings about them, and help me address any 
unconscious elements in them? After that surely it would be up to me to decide what 
if anything to do in terms of political action outside analysis. In addition feminism has 
long acquainted us with the notion that the personal is political (see Orbach 1998). So 




Partly for completeness sake, it seems important to acknowledge that other 
interpretations of this dream are also possible and could prove therapeutically more 
fruitful than those above. The tree could stand for mother with the air force in the 
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place of the Oedipal father. Both could stand for parts of the self. A transference 
interpretation involving my two analysts (represented by Freud and the Israeli air 
force) is also clearly possible. And the plum (bum) tree could even allude to the first 
stage of the alchemical work. An archetypal interpretation is also possible with the 
disembodied voice representing God expelling Adam and Eve from the Garden of 
Eden. And the purple skin of the ripe plums could refer back to the purple clothes in 
the dream I shared with my first analyst….. 
 
It is small wonder perhaps given such a plethora of possible interpretations that many 
therapists turn to the security of a formulaic method of working with dreams, 
systematically prioritising one type of interpretation over another. If the therapist 
resists this defensive manoeuvre however then the interesting question of how the 
analytic couple (see Carvalho present volume) decide which interpretation to actually 
pursue does arise- given that only one at a time can actually be worked with. 
Preferably of course this is the one most likely be therapeutic and open up 
unconscious material. Ideally that interpretation probably comes out of a mixture of 
the client’s feelings and associations and the analyst’s ability to sense the presence of 
the unconscious. All too often however the couple’s defences or preconceptions seem 
to be the determining factors.  
 
My own analyst actually emphasised the purposive nature of the dream. The old was 
being cleared to make way for the new. In effect she was telling me to put the past 
with my mad analyst behind me. Although kindly meant, this interpretation tended to 
block the work both of mourning and of understanding what had happened in my first 
analysis. This contributed to leaving us partially stuck in a paranoid schizoid way of 
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relating. From my analyst’s side it is conceivable that her difficulties coming to terms 
with the emotional effects of the holocaust played a part. I can only speculate that 
perhaps she had had to concrete over important aspects of her own past and that she 
was advising me to do likewise. In this sense perhaps her own unresolved traumas 
interfered with her ability to listen to my comments on the Arab Israeli conflict in a 




If there is one conclusion to be drawn from the above experiences and reflections, it is 
that it is extremely difficult to be there for another person without imposing our own 
conscious or unconscious agenda upon them. And yet as analysts this is precisely 
what we aspire to do. Of course at times we all fall short of that ideal. But it is hard to 
see how we could either directly discuss politics with our clients, or systematically 




In the course of this paper I have argued that it is analysts’ specific theoretical 
preoccupations, not something intrinsic to the analytic process itself that has led them 
to sometimes neglect their client’s legitimate concerns about the outside world. On 
this view the radical revisioning of analysis proposed by Samuels is unnecessary. In 
fact it could be harmful if it simply replaces one privileged piece of theory with 
another. I have gone on to use case material (both my own and that of a client) to 
illustrate what I consider to be some of the dangers of political discussion in analysis. 
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In particular I have suggested that political discussion is by its nature likely to 
encourage the intrusion of the analyst’s own views and judgements into the analytic 
process. This could tend to reinforce splitting processes in the client and distract from 
the analyst’s task of listening therapeutically to the client’s material. I have gone on to 
question Samuels’ simplistic suggestion that the existence of the analytic frame 
automatically confers protection from those dangers.  
 
I have also pointed out that Samuels is very unclear about exactly what he means by 
‘political discussion’ in therapy. I have tried to identify a type of discussion that uses 
political issues to encourage dialogue between different parts of the client’s self and 
suggested that this could in fact be therapeutic. I have argued though that this is 
possible in normal analytic practice, and in this sense we already have the tools to 
deal with political material, and therefore do not need to radically revision therapy.  
 
 I have also suggested that it is possible to treat certain aspects of Samuels’ proposal 
to politicise analysis as a defence against James Hillman’s damning criticisms of 
contemporary analysis. I have gone on to show why I believe those criticisms are 
themselves ill founded, and Samuels’ defence against them therefore unnecessary. 
 
Finally I have addressed Samuels’ notion of citizen as therapist to the world. I have 
tried to show that there are strong grounds for believing that material on both the 
client’s and the therapist’s side may reflect the impact of political events. I have also 
implied that it is as therapeutically important to try to understand unconscious 
elements in that as in any other analytic material. In addition it may well be 
therapeutic for the analyst to acknowledge the client’s emerging feelings about such 
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events. But the notion of citizen as therapist is already implied in the well-known 
feminist equation of the personal and the political. 
  
It should go without saying that some of the psychological concepts discussed in this 
paper could be usefully applied in the world of politics. I am thinking in particular of 
the mechanism of identification with the aggressor, and of the use of endless conflict 
as a defence against mourning and fears of engulfment. Despite years of analytic 
endeavour however- Gross (1913), Freud (1931), Reich (1933), Orbach (1978, 1998) 
etc.- the world has yet to show up for its first therapy session, as Samuels would put 
it.  So I shall have to leave it to those with greater therapeutic ambitions than myself 
to devise a way of getting it there. Meanwhile I hope I may be forgiven if I stick to the 
more modest task of listening to my clients’ concerns and attempting to attend to the 
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